"import * as TAGS from './tags.js';\nimport * as ATTRS from './attrs.js';\nimport * as EXPRESSIONS from './regexp.js';\nimport {\n addToSet,\n clone,\n freeze,\n arrayForEach,\n arrayPop,\n arrayPush,\n stringMatch,\n stringReplace,\n stringToLowerCase,\n stringToString,\n stringIndexOf,\n stringTrim,\n regExpTest,\n typeErrorCreate,\n lookupGetter,\n} from './utils.js';\n\nconst getGlobal = () => (typeof window === 'undefined' ? null : window);\n\n/**\n * Creates a no-op policy for internal use only.\n * Don't export this function outside this module!\n * @param {?TrustedTypePolicyFactory} trustedTypes The policy factory.\n * @param {Document} document The document object (to determine policy name suffix)\n * @return {?TrustedTypePolicy} The policy created (or null, if Trusted Types\n * are not supported).\n */\nconst _createTrustedTypesPolicy = function (trustedTypes, document) {\n if (\n typeof trustedTypes !== 'object' ||\n typeof trustedTypes.createPolicy !== 'function'\n ) {\n return null;\n }\n\n // Allow the callers to control the unique policy name\n // by adding a data-tt-policy-suffix to the script element with the DOMPurify.\n // Policy creation with duplicate names throws in Trusted Types.\n let suffix = null;\n const ATTR_NAME = 'data-tt-policy-suffix';\n if (\n document.currentScript &&\n document.currentScript.hasAttribute(ATTR_NAME)\n ) {\n suffix = document.currentScript.getAttribute(ATTR_NAME);\n }\n\n const policyName = 'dompurify' + (suffix ? '#' + suffix : '');\n\n try {\n return trustedTypes.createPolicy(policyName, {\n createHTML(html) {\n return html;\n },\n createScriptURL(scriptUrl) {\n return scriptUrl;\n },\n });\n } catch (_) {\n // Policy creation failed (most likely another DOMPurify script has\n // already run). Skip creating the policy, as this will only cause errors\n // if TT are enforced.\n console.warn(\n 'TrustedTypes policy ' + policyName + ' could not be created.'\n );\n return null;\n }\n};\n\nfunction createDOMPurify(window = getGlobal()) {\n const DOMPurify = (root) => createDOMPurify(root);\n\n /**\n * Version label, exposed for easier checks\n * if DOMPurify is up to date or not\n */\n DOMPurify.version = VERSION;\n\n /**\n * Array of elements that DOMPurify removed during sanitation.\n * Empty if nothing was removed.\n */\n DOMPurify.removed = [];\n\n if (!window || !window.document || window.document.nodeType !== 9) {\n // Not running in a browser, provide a factory function\n // so that you can pass your own Window\n DOMPurify.isSupported = false;\n\n return DOMPurify;\n }\n\n const originalDocument = window.document;\n\n let { document } = window;\n const {\n DocumentFragment,\n HTMLTemplateElement,\n Node,\n Element,\n NodeFilter,\n NamedNodeMap = window.NamedNodeMap || window.MozNamedAttrMap,\n HTMLFormElement,\n DOMParser,\n trustedTypes,\n } = window;\n\n const ElementPrototype = Element.prototype;\n\n const cloneNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'cloneNode');\n const getNextSibling = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'nextSibling');\n const getChildNodes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'childNodes');\n const getParentNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'parentNode');\n\n // As per issue #47, the web-components registry is inherited by a\n // new document created via createHTMLDocument. As per the spec\n // (http://w3c.github.io/webcomponents/spec/custom/#creating-and-passing-registries)\n // a new empty registry is used when creating a template contents owner\n // document, so we use that as our parent document to ensure nothing\n // is inherited.\n if (typeof HTMLTemplateElement === 'function') {\n const template = document.createElement('template');\n if (template.content && template.content.ownerDocument) {\n document = template.content.ownerDocument;\n }\n }\n\n const trustedTypesPolicy = _createTrustedTypesPolicy(\n trustedTypes,\n originalDocument\n );\n const emptyHTML = trustedTypesPolicy ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML('') : '';\n\n const {\n implementation,\n createNodeIterator,\n createDocumentFragment,\n getElementsByTagName,\n } = document;\n const { importNode } = originalDocument;\n\n let documentMode = {};\n try {\n documentMode = clone(document).documentMode ? document.documentMode : {};\n } catch (_) {}\n\n let hooks = {};\n\n /**\n * Expose whether this browser supports running the full DOMPurify.\n */\n DOMPurify.isSupported =\n typeof getParentNode === 'function' &&\n implementation &&\n implementation.createHTMLDocument !== undefined &&\n documentMode !== 9;\n\n const {\n MUSTACHE_EXPR,\n ERB_EXPR,\n TMPLIT_EXPR,\n DATA_ATTR,\n ARIA_ATTR,\n IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA,\n ATTR_WHITESPACE,\n CUSTOM_ELEMENT,\n } = EXPRESSIONS;\n\n let { IS_ALLOWED_URI } = EXPRESSIONS;\n\n /**\n * We consider the elements and attributes below to be safe. Ideally\n * don't add any new ones but feel free to remove unwanted ones.\n */\n\n /* allowed element names */\n let ALLOWED_TAGS = null;\n const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS = addToSet({}, [\n ...TAGS.html,\n ...TAGS.svg,\n ...TAGS.svgFilters,\n ...TAGS.mathMl,\n ...TAGS.text,\n ]);\n\n /* Allowed attribute names */\n let ALLOWED_ATTR = null;\n const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR = addToSet({}, [\n ...ATTRS.html,\n ...ATTRS.svg,\n ...ATTRS.mathMl,\n ...ATTRS.xml,\n ]);\n\n /*\n * Configure how DOMPUrify should handle custom elements and their attributes as well as customized built-in elements.\n * @property {RegExp|Function|null} tagNameCheck one of [null, regexPattern, predicate]. Default: `null` (disallow any custom elements)\n * @property {RegExp|Function|null} attributeNameCheck one of [null, regexPattern, predicate]. Default: `null` (disallow any attributes not on the allow list)\n * @property {boolean} allowCustomizedBuiltInElements allow custom elements derived from built-ins if they pass CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck. Default: `false`.\n */\n let CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = Object.seal(\n Object.create(null, {\n tagNameCheck: {\n writable: true,\n configurable: false,\n enumerable: true,\n value: null,\n },\n attributeNameCheck: {\n writable: true,\n configurable: false,\n enumerable: true,\n value: null,\n },\n allowCustomizedBuiltInElements: {\n writable: true,\n configurable: false,\n enumerable: true,\n value: false,\n },\n })\n );\n\n /* Explicitly forbidden tags (overrides ALLOWED_TAGS/ADD_TAGS) */\n let FORBID_TAGS = null;\n\n /* Explicitly forbidden attributes (overrides ALLOWED_ATTR/ADD_ATTR) */\n let FORBID_ATTR = null;\n\n /* Decide if ARIA attributes are okay */\n let ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR = true;\n\n /* Decide if custom data attributes are okay */\n let ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = true;\n\n /* Decide if unknown protocols are okay */\n let ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS = false;\n\n /* Decide if self-closing tags in attributes are allowed.\n * Usually removed due to a mXSS issue in jQuery 3.0 */\n let ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR = true;\n\n /* Output should be safe for common template engines.\n * This means, DOMPurify removes data attributes, mustaches and ERB\n */\n let SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES = false;\n\n /* Output should be safe even for XML used within HTML and alike.\n * This means, DOMPurify removes comments when containing risky content.\n */\n let SAFE_FOR_XML = true;\n\n /* Decide if document with <html>... should be returned */\n let WHOLE_DOCUMENT = false;\n\n /* Track whether config is already set on this instance of DOMPurify. */\n let SET_CONFIG = false;\n\n /* Decide if all elements (e.g. style, script) must be children of\n * document.body. By default, browsers might move them to document.head */\n let FORCE_BODY = false;\n\n /* Decide if a DOM `HTMLBodyElement` should be returned, instead of a html\n * string (or a TrustedHTML object if Trusted Types are supported).\n * If `WHOLE_DOCUMENT` is enabled a `HTMLHtmlElement` will be returned instead\n */\n let RETURN_DOM = false;\n\n /* Decide if a DOM `DocumentFragment` should be returned, instead of a html\n * string (or a TrustedHTML object if Trusted Types are supported) */\n let RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT = false;\n\n /* Try to return a Trusted Type object instead of a string, return a string in\n * case Trusted Types are not supported */\n let RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE = false;\n\n /* Output should be free from DOM clobbering attacks?\n * This sanitizes markups named with colliding, clobberable built-in DOM APIs.\n */\n let SANITIZE_DOM = true;\n\n /* Achieve full DOM Clobbering protection by isolating the namespace of named\n * properties and JS variables, mitigating attacks that abuse the HTML/DOM spec rules.\n *\n * HTML/DOM spec rules that enable DOM Clobbering:\n * - Named Access on Window (\u00a77.3.3)\n * - DOM Tree Accessors (\u00a73.1.5)\n * - Form Element Parent-Child Relations (\u00a74.10.3)\n * - Iframe srcdoc / Nested WindowProxies (\u00a74.8.5)\n * - HTMLCollection (\u00a74.2.10.2)\n *\n * Namespace isolation is implemented by prefixing `id` and `name` attributes\n * with a constant string, i.e., `user-content-`\n */\n let SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS = false;\n const SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX = 'user-content-';\n\n /* Keep element content when removing element? */\n let KEEP_CONTENT = true;\n\n /* If a `Node` is passed to sanitize(), then performs sanitization in-place instead\n * of importing it into a new Document and returning a sanitized copy */\n let IN_PLACE = false;\n\n /* Allow usage of profiles like html, svg and mathMl */\n let USE_PROFILES = {};\n\n /* Tags to ignore content of when KEEP_CONTENT is true */\n let FORBID_CONTENTS = null;\n const DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS = addToSet({}, [\n 'annotation-xml',\n 'audio',\n 'colgroup',\n 'desc',\n 'foreignobject',\n 'head',\n 'iframe',\n 'math',\n 'mi',\n 'mn',\n 'mo',\n 'ms',\n 'mtext',\n 'noembed',\n 'noframes',\n 'noscript',\n 'plaintext',\n 'script',\n 'style',\n 'svg',\n 'template',\n 'thead',\n 'title',\n 'video',\n 'xmp',\n ]);\n\n /* Tags that are safe for data: URIs */\n let DATA_URI_TAGS = null;\n const DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS = addToSet({}, [\n 'audio',\n 'video',\n 'img',\n 'source',\n 'image',\n 'track',\n ]);\n\n /* Attributes safe for values like \"javascript:\" */\n let URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = null;\n const DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = addToSet({}, [\n 'alt',\n 'class',\n 'for',\n 'id',\n 'label',\n 'name',\n 'pattern',\n 'placeholder',\n 'role',\n 'summary',\n 'title',\n 'value',\n 'style',\n 'xmlns',\n ]);\n\n const MATHML_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML';\n const SVG_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/2000/svg';\n const HTML_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml';\n /* Document namespace */\n let NAMESPACE = HTML_NAMESPACE;\n let IS_EMPTY_INPUT = false;\n\n /* Allowed XHTML+XML namespaces */\n let ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = null;\n const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = addToSet(\n {},\n [MATHML_NAMESPACE, SVG_NAMESPACE, HTML_NAMESPACE],\n stringToString\n );\n\n /* Parsing of strict XHTML documents */\n let PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE;\n const SUPPORTED_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPES = ['application/xhtml+xml', 'text/html'];\n const DEFAULT_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE = 'text/html';\n let transformCaseFunc;\n\n /* Keep a reference to config to pass to hooks */\n let CONFIG = null;\n\n /* Ideally, do not touch anything below this line */\n /* ______________________________________________ */\n\n const formElement = document.createElement('form');\n\n const isRegexOrFunction = function (testValue) {\n return testValue instanceof RegExp || testValue instanceof Function;\n };\n\n /**\n * _parseConfig\n *\n * @param {Object} cfg optional config literal\n */\n // eslint-disable-next-line complexity\n const _parseConfig = function (cfg) {\n if (CONFIG && CONFIG === cfg) {\n return;\n }\n\n /* Shield configuration object from tampering */\n if (!cfg || typeof cfg !== 'object') {\n cfg = {};\n }\n\n /* Shield configuration object from prototype pollution */\n cfg = clone(cfg);\n\n PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE =\n // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-includes\n SUPPORTED_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPES.indexOf(cfg.PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE) === -1\n ? (PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE = DEFAULT_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE)\n : (PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE = cfg.PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE);\n\n // HTML tags and attributes are not case-sensitive, converting to lowercase. Keeping XHTML as is.\n transformCaseFunc =\n PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml'\n ? stringToString\n : stringToLowerCase;\n\n /* Set configuration parameters */\n ALLOWED_TAGS =\n 'ALLOWED_TAGS' in cfg\n ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_TAGS, transformCaseFunc)\n : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS;\n ALLOWED_ATTR =\n 'ALLOWED_ATTR' in cfg\n ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_ATTR, transformCaseFunc)\n : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR;\n ALLOWED_NAMESPACES =\n 'ALLOWED_NAMESPACES' in cfg\n ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_NAMESPACES, stringToString)\n : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES;\n URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES =\n 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR' in cfg\n ? addToSet(\n clone(DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES), // eslint-disable-line indent\n cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR, // eslint-disable-line indent\n transformCaseFunc // eslint-disable-line indent\n ) // eslint-disable-line indent\n : DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES;\n DATA_URI_TAGS =\n 'ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS' in cfg\n ? addToSet(\n clone(DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS), // eslint-disable-line indent\n cfg.ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS, // eslint-disable-line indent\n transformCaseFunc // eslint-disable-line indent\n ) // eslint-disable-line indent\n : DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS;\n FORBID_CONTENTS =\n 'FORBID_CONTENTS' in cfg\n ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc)\n : DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS;\n FORBID_TAGS =\n 'FORBID_TAGS' in cfg\n ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_TAGS, transformCaseFunc)\n : {};\n FORBID_ATTR =\n 'FORBID_ATTR' in cfg\n ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_ATTR, transformCaseFunc)\n : {};\n USE_PROFILES = 'USE_PROFILES' in cfg ? cfg.USE_PROFILES : false;\n ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR !== false; // Default true\n ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_DATA_ATTR !== false; // Default true\n ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS = cfg.ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS || false; // Default false\n ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR !== false; // Default true\n SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES = cfg.SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES || false; // Default false\n SAFE_FOR_XML = cfg.SAFE_FOR_XML !== false; // Default true\n WHOLE_DOCUMENT = cfg.WHOLE_DOCUMENT || false; // Default false\n RETURN_DOM = cfg.RETURN_DOM || false; // Default false\n RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT = cfg.RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT || false; // Default false\n RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE = cfg.RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE || false; // Default false\n FORCE_BODY = cfg.FORCE_BODY || false; // Default false\n SANITIZE_DOM = cfg.SANITIZE_DOM !== false; // Default true\n SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS = cfg.SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS || false; // Default false\n KEEP_CONTENT = cfg.KEEP_CONTENT !== false; // Default true\n IN_PLACE = cfg.IN_PLACE || false; // Default false\n IS_ALLOWED_URI = cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP || IS_ALLOWED_URI;\n NAMESPACE = cfg.NAMESPACE || HTML_NAMESPACE;\n CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING || {};\n if (\n cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING &&\n isRegexOrFunction(cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck)\n ) {\n CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck =\n cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck;\n }\n\n if (\n cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING &&\n isRegexOrFunction(cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck)\n ) {\n CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck =\n cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck;\n }\n\n if (\n cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING &&\n typeof cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements ===\n 'boolean'\n ) {\n CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements =\n cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements;\n }\n\n if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {\n ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = false;\n }\n\n if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {\n RETURN_DOM = true;\n }\n\n /* Parse profile info */\n if (USE_PROFILES) {\n ALLOWED_TAGS = addToSet({}, [...TAGS.text]);\n ALLOWED_ATTR = [];\n if (USE_PROFILES.html === true) {\n addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, TAGS.html);\n addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.html);\n }\n\n if (USE_PROFILES.svg === true) {\n addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, TAGS.svg);\n addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.svg);\n addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.xml);\n }\n\n if (USE_PROFILES.svgFilters === true) {\n addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, TAGS.svgFilters);\n addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.svg);\n addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.xml);\n }\n\n if (USE_PROFILES.mathMl === true) {\n addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, TAGS.mathMl);\n addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.mathMl);\n addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.xml);\n }\n }\n\n /* Merge configuration parameters */\n if (cfg.ADD_TAGS) {\n if (ALLOWED_TAGS === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS) {\n ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);\n }\n\n addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, cfg.ADD_TAGS, transformCaseFunc);\n }\n\n if (cfg.ADD_ATTR) {\n if (ALLOWED_ATTR === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR) {\n ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);\n }\n\n addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, cfg.ADD_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);\n }\n\n if (cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR) {\n addToSet(URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES, cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);\n }\n\n if (cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS) {\n if (FORBID_CONTENTS === DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS) {\n FORBID_CONTENTS = clone(FORBID_CONTENTS);\n }\n\n addToSet(FORBID_CONTENTS, cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc);\n }\n\n /* Add #text in case KEEP_CONTENT is set to true */\n if (KEEP_CONTENT) {\n ALLOWED_TAGS['#text'] = true;\n }\n\n /* Add html, head and body to ALLOWED_TAGS in case WHOLE_DOCUMENT is true */\n if (WHOLE_DOCUMENT) {\n addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, ['html', 'head', 'body']);\n }\n\n /* Add tbody to ALLOWED_TAGS in case tables are permitted, see #286, #365 */\n if (ALLOWED_TAGS.table) {\n addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, ['tbody']);\n delete FORBID_TAGS.tbody;\n }\n\n // Prevent further manipulation of configuration.\n // Not available in IE8, Safari 5, etc.\n if (freeze) {\n freeze(cfg);\n }\n\n CONFIG = cfg;\n };\n\n const MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, [\n 'mi',\n 'mo',\n 'mn',\n 'ms',\n 'mtext',\n ]);\n\n const HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml']);\n\n // Certain elements are allowed in both SVG and HTML\n // namespace. We need to specify them explicitly\n // so that they don't get erroneously deleted from\n // HTML namespace.\n const COMMON_SVG_AND_HTML_ELEMENTS = addToSet({}, [\n 'title',\n 'style',\n 'font',\n 'a',\n 'script',\n ]);\n\n /* Keep track of all possible SVG and MathML tags\n * so that we can perform the namespace checks\n * correctly. */\n const ALL_SVG_TAGS = addToSet({}, TAGS.svg);\n addToSet(ALL_SVG_TAGS, TAGS.svgFilters);\n addToSet(ALL_SVG_TAGS, TAGS.svgDisallowed);\n\n const ALL_MATHML_TAGS = addToSet({}, TAGS.mathMl);\n addToSet(ALL_MATHML_TAGS, TAGS.mathMlDisallowed);\n\n /**\n *\n *\n * @param {Element} element a DOM element whose namespace is being checked\n * @returns {boolean} Return false if the element has a\n * namespace that a spec-compliant parser would never\n * return. Return true otherwise.\n */\n const _checkValidNamespace = function (element) {\n let parent = getParentNode(element);\n\n // In JSDOM, if we're inside shadow DOM, then parentNode\n // can be null. We just simulate parent in this case.\n if (!parent || !parent.tagName) {\n parent = {\n namespaceURI: NAMESPACE,\n tagName: 'template',\n };\n }\n\n const tagName = stringToLowerCase(element.tagName);\n const parentTagName = stringToLowerCase(parent.tagName);\n\n if (!ALLOWED_NAMESPACES[element.namespaceURI]) {\n return false;\n }\n\n if (element.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {\n // The only way to switch from HTML namespace to SVG\n // is via <svg>. If it happens via any other tag, then\n // it should be killed.\n if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {\n return tagName === 'svg';\n }\n\n // The only way to switch from MathML to SVG is via`\n // svg if parent is either <annotation-xml> or MathML\n // text integration points.\n if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {\n return (\n tagName === 'svg' &&\n (parentTagName === 'annotation-xml' ||\n MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName])\n );\n }\n\n // We only allow elements that are defined in SVG\n // spec. All others are disallowed in SVG namespace.\n return Boolean(ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);\n }\n\n if (element.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {\n // The only way to switch from HTML namespace to MathML\n // is via <math>. If it happens via any other tag, then\n // it should be killed.\n if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {\n return tagName === 'math';\n }\n\n // The only way to switch from SVG to MathML is via\n // <math> and HTML integration points\n if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {\n return tagName === 'math' && HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName];\n }\n\n // We only allow elements that are defined in MathML\n // spec. All others are disallowed in MathML namespace.\n return Boolean(ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName]);\n }\n\n if (element.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {\n // The only way to switch from SVG to HTML is via\n // HTML integration points, and from MathML to HTML\n // is via MathML text integration points\n if (\n parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE &&\n !HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]\n ) {\n return false;\n }\n\n if (\n parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE &&\n !MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]\n ) {\n return false;\n }\n\n // We disallow tags that are specific for MathML\n // or SVG and should never appear in HTML namespace\n return (\n !ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName] &&\n (COMMON_SVG_AND_HTML_ELEMENTS[tagName] || !ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName])\n );\n }\n\n // For XHTML and XML documents that support custom namespaces\n if (\n PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' &&\n ALLOWED_NAMESPACES[element.namespaceURI]\n ) {\n return true;\n }\n\n // The code should never reach this place (this means\n // that the element somehow got namespace that is not\n // HTML, SVG, MathML or allowed via ALLOWED_NAMESPACES).\n // Return false just in case.\n return false;\n };\n\n /**\n * _forceRemove\n *\n * @param {Node} node a DOM node\n */\n const _forceRemove = function (node) {\n arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, { element: node });\n try {\n // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-remove\n node.parentNode.removeChild(node);\n } catch (_) {\n try {\n node.outerHTML = emptyHTML;\n } catch (_) {\n node.remove();\n }\n }\n };\n\n /**\n * _removeAttribute\n *\n * @param {String} name an Attribute name\n * @param {Node} node a DOM node\n */\n const _removeAttribute = function (name, node) {\n try {\n arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {\n attribute: node.getAttributeNode(name),\n from: node,\n });\n } catch (_) {\n arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {\n attribute: null,\n from: node,\n });\n }\n\n node.removeAttribute(name);\n\n // We void attribute values for unremovable \"is\"\" attributes\n if (name === 'is' && !ALLOWED_ATTR[name]) {\n if (RETURN_DOM || RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {\n try {\n _forceRemove(node);\n } catch (_) {}\n } else {\n try {\n node.setAttribute(name, '');\n } catch (_) {}\n }\n }\n };\n\n /**\n * _initDocument\n *\n * @param {String} dirty a string of dirty markup\n * @return {Document} a DOM, filled with the dirty markup\n */\n const _initDocument = function (dirty) {\n /* Create a HTML document */\n let doc;\n let leadingWhitespace;\n\n if (FORCE_BODY) {\n dirty = '<remove></remove>' + dirty;\n } else {\n /* If FORCE_BODY isn't used, leading whitespace needs to be preserved manually */\n const matches = stringMatch(dirty, /^[\\r\\n\\t ]+/);\n leadingWhitespace = matches && matches[0];\n }\n\n if (\n PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' &&\n NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE\n ) {\n // Root of XHTML doc must contain xmlns declaration (see https://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/normative.html#strict)\n dirty =\n '<html xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml\"><head></head><body>' +\n dirty +\n '</body></html>';\n }\n\n const dirtyPayload = trustedTypesPolicy\n ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(dirty)\n : dirty;\n /*\n * Use the DOMParser API by default, fallback later if needs be\n * DOMParser not work for svg when has multiple root element.\n */\n if (NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE) {\n try {\n doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(dirtyPayload, PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE);\n } catch (_) {}\n }\n\n /* Use createHTMLDocument in case DOMParser is not available */\n if (!doc || !doc.documentElement) {\n doc = implementation.createDocument(NAMESPACE, 'template', null);\n try {\n doc.documentElement.innerHTML = IS_EMPTY_INPUT\n ? emptyHTML\n : dirtyPayload;\n } catch (_) {\n // Syntax error if dirtyPayload is invalid xml\n }\n }\n\n const body = doc.body || doc.documentElement;\n\n if (dirty && leadingWhitespace) {\n body.insertBefore(\n document.createTextNode(leadingWhitespace),\n body.childNodes[0] || null\n );\n }\n\n /* Work on whole document or just its body */\n if (NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE) {\n return getElementsByTagName.call(\n doc,\n WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? 'html' : 'body'\n )[0];\n }\n\n return WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? doc.documentElement : body;\n };\n\n /**\n * _createIterator\n *\n * @param {Document} root document/fragment to create iterator for\n * @return {Iterator} iterator instance\n */\n const _createIterator = function (root) {\n return createNodeIterator.call(\n root.ownerDocument || root,\n root,\n // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise\n NodeFilter.SHOW_ELEMENT |\n NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT |\n NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT |\n NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION |\n NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION,\n null,\n false\n );\n };\n\n /**\n * _isClobbered\n *\n * @param {Node} elm element to check for clobbering attacks\n * @return {Boolean} true if clobbered, false if safe\n */\n const _isClobbered = function (elm) {\n return (\n elm instanceof HTMLFormElement &&\n (typeof elm.nodeName !== 'string' ||\n typeof elm.textContent !== 'string' ||\n typeof elm.removeChild !== 'function' ||\n !(elm.attributes instanceof NamedNodeMap) ||\n typeof elm.removeAttribute !== 'function' ||\n typeof elm.setAttribute !== 'function' ||\n typeof elm.namespaceURI !== 'string' ||\n typeof elm.insertBefore !== 'function' ||\n typeof elm.hasChildNodes !== 'function')\n );\n };\n\n /**\n * _isNode\n *\n * @param {Node} obj object to check whether it's a DOM node\n * @return {Boolean} true is object is a DOM node\n */\n const _isNode = function (object) {\n return typeof Node === 'object'\n ? object instanceof Node\n : object &&\n typeof object === 'object' &&\n typeof object.nodeType === 'number' &&\n typeof object.nodeName === 'string';\n };\n\n /**\n * _executeHook\n * Execute user configurable hooks\n *\n * @param {String} entryPoint Name of the hook's entry point\n * @param {Node} currentNode node to work on with the hook\n * @param {Object} data additional hook parameters\n */\n const _executeHook = function (entryPoint, currentNode, data) {\n if (!hooks[entryPoint]) {\n return;\n }\n\n arrayForEach(hooks[entryPoint], (hook) => {\n hook.call(DOMPurify, currentNode, data, CONFIG);\n });\n };\n\n /**\n * _sanitizeElements\n *\n * @protect nodeName\n * @protect textContent\n * @protect removeChild\n *\n * @param {Node} currentNode to check for permission to exist\n * @return {Boolean} true if node was killed, false if left alive\n */\n const _sanitizeElements = function (currentNode) {\n let content;\n\n /* Execute a hook if present */\n _executeHook('beforeSanitizeElements', currentNode, null);\n\n /* Check if element is clobbered or can clobber */\n if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {\n _forceRemove(currentNode);\n return true;\n }\n\n /* Check if tagname contains Unicode */\n if (regExpTest(/[\\u0080-\\uFFFF]/, currentNode.nodeName)) {\n _forceRemove(currentNode);\n return true;\n }\n\n /* Now let's check the element's type and name */\n const tagName = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);\n\n /* Execute a hook if present */\n _executeHook('uponSanitizeElement', currentNode, {\n tagName,\n allowedTags: ALLOWED_TAGS,\n });\n\n /* Detect mXSS attempts abusing namespace confusion */\n if (\n currentNode.hasChildNodes() &&\n !_isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild) &&\n (!_isNode(currentNode.content) ||\n !_isNode(currentNode.content.firstElementChild)) &&\n regExpTest(/<[/\\w]/g, currentNode.innerHTML) &&\n regExpTest(/<[/\\w]/g, currentNode.textContent)\n ) {\n _forceRemove(currentNode);\n return true;\n }\n\n /* Mitigate a problem with templates inside select */\n if (\n tagName === 'select' &&\n regExpTest(/<template/i, currentNode.innerHTML)\n ) {\n _forceRemove(currentNode);\n return true;\n }\n\n /* Remove any ocurrence of processing instructions */\n if (currentNode.nodeType === 7) {\n _forceRemove(currentNode);\n return true;\n }\n\n /* Remove any kind of possibly harmful comments */\n if (\n SAFE_FOR_XML &&\n currentNode.nodeType === 8 &&\n regExpTest(/<[/\\w]/g, currentNode.data)\n ) {\n _forceRemove(currentNode);\n return true;\n }\n\n /* Remove element if anything forbids its presence */\n if (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {\n /* Check if we have a custom element to handle */\n if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _basicCustomElementTest(tagName)) {\n if (\n CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp &&\n regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)\n )\n return false;\n if (\n CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function &&\n CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(tagName)\n )\n return false;\n }\n\n /* Keep content except for bad-listed elements */\n if (KEEP_CONTENT && !FORBID_CONTENTS[tagName]) {\n const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode) || currentNode.parentNode;\n const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode) || currentNode.childNodes;\n\n if (childNodes && parentNode) {\n const childCount = childNodes.length;\n\n for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {\n const childClone = cloneNode(childNodes[i], true);\n childClone.__removalCount = (currentNode.__removalCount || 0) + 1;\n parentNode.insertBefore(childClone, getNextSibling(currentNode));\n }\n }\n }\n\n _forceRemove(currentNode);\n return true;\n }\n\n /* Check whether element has a valid namespace */\n if (currentNode instanceof Element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) {\n _forceRemove(currentNode);\n return true;\n }\n\n /* Make sure that older browsers don't get fallback-tag mXSS */\n if (\n (tagName === 'noscript' ||\n tagName === 'noembed' ||\n tagName === 'noframes') &&\n regExpTest(/<\\/no(script|embed|frames)/i, currentNode.innerHTML)\n ) {\n _forceRemove(currentNode);\n return true;\n }\n\n /* Sanitize element content to be template-safe */\n if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && currentNode.nodeType === 3) {\n /* Get the element's text content */\n content = currentNode.textContent;\n content = stringReplace(content, MUSTACHE_EXPR, ' ');\n content = stringReplace(content, ERB_EXPR, ' ');\n content = stringReplace(content, TMPLIT_EXPR, ' ');\n if (currentNode.textContent !== content) {\n arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, { element: currentNode.cloneNode() });\n currentNode.textContent = content;\n }\n }\n\n /* Execute a hook if present */\n _executeHook('afterSanitizeElements', currentNode, null);\n\n return false;\n };\n\n /**\n * _isValidAttribute\n *\n * @param {string} lcTag Lowercase tag name of containing element.\n * @param {string} lcName Lowercase attribute name.\n * @param {string} value Attribute value.\n * @return {Boolean} Returns true if `value` is valid, otherwise false.\n */\n // eslint-disable-next-line complexity\n const _isValidAttribute = function (lcTag, lcName, value) {\n /* Make sure attribute cannot clobber */\n if (\n SANITIZE_DOM &&\n (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') &&\n (value in document || value in formElement)\n ) {\n return false;\n }\n\n /* Allow valid data-* attributes: At least one character after \"-\"\n (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#embedding-custom-non-visible-data-with-the-data-*-attributes)\n XML-compatible (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/infrastructure.html#xml-compatible and http://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#d0e804)\n We don't need to check the value; it's always URI safe. */\n if (\n ALLOW_DATA_ATTR &&\n !FORBID_ATTR[lcName] &&\n regExpTest(DATA_ATTR, lcName)\n ) {\n // This attribute is safe\n } else if (ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR && regExpTest(ARIA_ATTR, lcName)) {\n // This attribute is safe\n /* Otherwise, check the name is permitted */\n } else if (!ALLOWED_ATTR[lcName] || FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {\n if (\n // First condition does a very basic check if a) it's basically a valid custom element tagname AND\n // b) if the tagName passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck\n // and c) if the attribute name passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck\n (_basicCustomElementTest(lcTag) &&\n ((CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp &&\n regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, lcTag)) ||\n (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function &&\n CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(lcTag))) &&\n ((CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck instanceof RegExp &&\n regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck, lcName)) ||\n (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck instanceof Function &&\n CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck(lcName)))) ||\n // Alternative, second condition checks if it's an `is`-attribute, AND\n // the value passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck\n (lcName === 'is' &&\n CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements &&\n ((CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp &&\n regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, value)) ||\n (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function &&\n CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(value))))\n ) {\n // If user has supplied a regexp or function in CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, we need to also allow derived custom elements using the same tagName test.\n // Additionally, we need to allow attributes passing the CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck user has configured, as custom elements can define these at their own discretion.\n } else {\n return false;\n }\n /* Check value is safe. First, is attr inert? If so, is safe */\n } else if (URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES[lcName]) {\n // This attribute is safe\n /* Check no script, data or unknown possibly unsafe URI\n unless we know URI values are safe for that attribute */\n } else if (\n regExpTest(IS_ALLOWED_URI, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE, ''))\n ) {\n // This attribute is safe\n /* Keep image data URIs alive if src/xlink:href is allowed */\n /* Further prevent gadget XSS for dynamically built script tags */\n } else if (\n (lcName === 'src' || lcName === 'xlink:href' || lcName === 'href') &&\n lcTag !== 'script' &&\n stringIndexOf(value, 'data:') === 0 &&\n DATA_URI_TAGS[lcTag]\n ) {\n // This attribute is safe\n /* Allow unknown protocols: This provides support for links that\n are handled by protocol handlers which may be unknown ahead of\n time, e.g. fb:, spotify: */\n } else if (\n ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS &&\n !regExpTest(IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE, ''))\n ) {\n // This attribute is safe\n /* Check for binary attributes */\n } else if (value) {\n return false;\n } else {\n // Binary attributes are safe at this point\n /* Anything else, presume unsafe, do not add it back */\n }\n\n return true;\n };\n\n /**\n * _basicCustomElementCheck\n * checks if at least one dash is included in tagName, and it's not the first char\n * for more sophisticated checking see https://github.com/sindresorhus/validate-element-name\n * @param {string} tagName name of the tag of the node to sanitize\n */\n const _basicCustomElementTest = function (tagName) {\n return tagName !== 'annotation-xml' && stringMatch(tagName, CUSTOM_ELEMENT);\n };\n\n /**\n * _sanitizeAttributes\n *\n * @protect attributes\n * @protect nodeName\n * @protect removeAttribute\n * @protect setAttribute\n *\n * @param {Node} currentNode to sanitize\n */\n const _sanitizeAttributes = function (currentNode) {\n let attr;\n let value;\n let lcName;\n let l;\n /* Execute a hook if present */\n _executeHook('beforeSanitizeAttributes', currentNode, null);\n\n const { attributes } = currentNode;\n\n /* Check if we have attributes; if not we might have a text node */\n if (!attributes) {\n return;\n }\n\n const hookEvent = {\n attrName: '',\n attrValue: '',\n keepAttr: true,\n allowedAttributes: ALLOWED_ATTR,\n };\n l = attributes.length;\n\n /* Go backwards over all attributes; safely remove bad ones */\n while (l--) {\n attr = attributes[l];\n const { name, namespaceURI } = attr;\n value = name === 'value' ? attr.value : stringTrim(attr.value);\n lcName = transformCaseFunc(name);\n\n /* Execute a hook if present */\n hookEvent.attrName = lcName;\n hookEvent.attrValue = value;\n hookEvent.keepAttr = true;\n hookEvent.forceKeepAttr = undefined; // Allows developers to see this is a property they can set\n _executeHook('uponSanitizeAttribute', currentNode, hookEvent);\n value = hookEvent.attrValue;\n\n /* Did the hooks approve of the attribute? */\n if (hookEvent.forceKeepAttr) {\n continue;\n }\n\n /* Remove attribute */\n _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);\n\n /* Did the hooks approve of the attribute? */\n if (!hookEvent.keepAttr) {\n continue;\n }\n\n /* Work around a security issue in jQuery 3.0 */\n if (!ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR && regExpTest(/\\/>/i, value)) {\n _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);\n continue;\n }\n\n /* Sanitize attribute content to be template-safe */\n if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {\n value = stringReplace(value, MUSTACHE_EXPR, ' ');\n value = stringReplace(value, ERB_EXPR, ' ');\n value = stringReplace(value, TMPLIT_EXPR, ' ');\n }\n\n /* Is `value` valid for this attribute? */\n const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);\n if (!_isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value)) {\n continue;\n }\n\n /* Full DOM Clobbering protection via namespace isolation,\n * Prefix id and name attributes with `user-content-`\n */\n if (SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name')) {\n // Remove the attribute with this value\n _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);\n\n // Prefix the value and later re-create the attribute with the sanitized value\n value = SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX + value;\n }\n\n /* Work around a security issue with comments inside attributes */\n if (SAFE_FOR_XML && regExpTest(/((--!?|])>)|<\\/(style|title)/i, value)) {\n _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);\n continue;\n }\n\n /* Handle attributes that require Trusted Types */\n if (\n trustedTypesPolicy &&\n typeof trustedTypes === 'object' &&\n typeof trustedTypes.getAttributeType === 'function'\n ) {\n if (namespaceURI) {\n /* Namespaces are not yet supported, see https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1305293 */\n } else {\n switch (trustedTypes.getAttributeType(lcTag, lcName)) {\n case 'TrustedHTML': {\n value = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(value);\n break;\n }\n\n case 'TrustedScriptURL': {\n value = trustedTypesPolicy.createScriptURL(value);\n break;\n }\n\n default: {\n break;\n }\n }\n }\n }\n\n /* Handle invalid data-* attribute set by try-catching it */\n try {\n if (namespaceURI) {\n currentNode.setAttributeNS(namespaceURI, name, value);\n } else {\n /* Fallback to setAttribute() for browser-unrecognized namespaces e.g. \"x-schema\". */\n currentNode.setAttribute(name, value);\n }\n\n if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {\n _forceRemove(currentNode);\n } else {\n arrayPop(DOMPurify.removed);\n }\n } catch (_) {}\n }\n\n /* Execute a hook if present */\n _executeHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', currentNode, null);\n };\n\n /**\n * _sanitizeShadowDOM\n *\n * @param {DocumentFragment} fragment to iterate over recursively\n */\n const _sanitizeShadowDOM = function (fragment) {\n let shadowNode;\n const shadowIterator = _createIterator(fragment);\n\n /* Execute a hook if present */\n _executeHook('beforeSanitizeShadowDOM', fragment, null);\n\n while ((shadowNode = shadowIterator.nextNode())) {\n /* Execute a hook if present */\n _executeHook('uponSanitizeShadowNode', shadowNode, null);\n\n /* Sanitize tags and elements */\n if (_sanitizeElements(shadowNode)) {\n continue;\n }\n\n /* Deep shadow DOM detected */\n if (shadowNode.content instanceof DocumentFragment) {\n _sanitizeShadowDOM(shadowNode.content);\n }\n\n /* Check attributes, sanitize if necessary */\n _sanitizeAttributes(shadowNode);\n }\n\n /* Execute a hook if present */\n _executeHook('afterSanitizeShadowDOM', fragment, null);\n };\n\n /**\n * Sanitize\n * Public method providing core sanitation functionality\n *\n * @param {String|Node} dirty string or DOM node\n * @param {Object} configuration object\n */\n // eslint-disable-next-line complexity\n DOMPurify.sanitize = function (dirty, cfg = {}) {\n let body;\n let importedNode;\n let currentNode;\n let oldNode;\n let returnNode;\n /* Make sure we have a string to sanitize.\n DO NOT return early, as this will return the wrong type if\n the user has requested a DOM object rather than a string */\n IS_EMPTY_INPUT = !dirty;\n if (IS_EMPTY_INPUT) {\n dirty = '<!-->';\n }\n\n /* Stringify, in case dirty is an object */\n if (typeof dirty !== 'string' && !_isNode(dirty)) {\n if (typeof dirty.toString === 'function') {\n dirty = dirty.toString();\n if (typeof dirty !== 'string') {\n throw typeErrorCreate('dirty is not a string, aborting');\n }\n } else {\n throw typeErrorCreate('toString is not a function');\n }\n }\n\n /* Check we can run. Otherwise fall back or ignore */\n if (!DOMPurify.isSupported) {\n if (\n typeof window.toStaticHTML === 'object' ||\n typeof window.toStaticHTML === 'function'\n ) {\n if (typeof dirty === 'string') {\n return window.toStaticHTML(dirty);\n }\n\n if (_isNode(dirty)) {\n return window.toStaticHTML(dirty.outerHTML);\n }\n }\n\n return dirty;\n }\n\n /* Assign config vars */\n if (!SET_CONFIG) {\n _parseConfig(cfg);\n }\n\n /* Clean up removed elements */\n DOMPurify.removed = [];\n\n /* Check if dirty is correctly typed for IN_PLACE */\n if (typeof dirty === 'string') {\n IN_PLACE = false;\n }\n\n if (IN_PLACE) {\n /* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes */\n if (dirty.nodeName) {\n const tagName = transformCaseFunc(dirty.nodeName);\n if (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {\n throw typeErrorCreate(\n 'root node is forbidden and cannot be sanitized in-place'\n );\n }\n }\n } else if (dirty instanceof Node) {\n /* If dirty is a DOM element, append to an empty document to avoid\n elements being stripped by the parser */\n body = _initDocument('<!---->');\n importedNode = body.ownerDocument.importNode(dirty, true);\n if (importedNode.nodeType === 1 && importedNode.nodeName === 'BODY') {\n /* Node is already a body, use as is */\n body = importedNode;\n } else if (importedNode.nodeName === 'HTML') {\n body = importedNode;\n } else {\n // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-append\n body.appendChild(importedNode);\n }\n } else {\n /* Exit directly if we have nothing to do */\n if (\n !RETURN_DOM &&\n !SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES &&\n !WHOLE_DOCUMENT &&\n // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-includes\n dirty.indexOf('<') === -1\n ) {\n return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE\n ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(dirty)\n : dirty;\n }\n\n /* Initialize the document to work on */\n body = _initDocument(dirty);\n\n /* Check we have a DOM node from the data */\n if (!body) {\n return RETURN_DOM ? null : RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? emptyHTML : '';\n }\n }\n\n /* Remove first element node (ours) if FORCE_BODY is set */\n if (body && FORCE_BODY) {\n _forceRemove(body.firstChild);\n }\n\n /* Get node iterator */\n const nodeIterator = _createIterator(IN_PLACE ? dirty : body);\n\n /* Now start iterating over the created document */\n while ((currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode())) {\n /* Fix IE's strange behavior with manipulated textNodes #89 */\n if (currentNode.nodeType === 3 && currentNode === oldNode) {\n continue;\n }\n\n /* Sanitize tags and elements */\n if (_sanitizeElements(currentNode)) {\n continue;\n }\n\n /* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it */\n if (currentNode.content instanceof DocumentFragment) {\n _sanitizeShadowDOM(currentNode.content);\n }\n\n /* Check attributes, sanitize if necessary */\n _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);\n\n oldNode = currentNode;\n }\n\n oldNode = null;\n\n /* If we sanitized `dirty` in-place, return it. */\n if (IN_PLACE) {\n return dirty;\n }\n\n /* Return sanitized string or DOM */\n if (RETURN_DOM) {\n if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {\n returnNode = createDocumentFragment.call(body.ownerDocument);\n\n while (body.firstChild) {\n // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-append\n returnNode.appendChild(body.firstChild);\n }\n } else {\n returnNode = body;\n }\n\n if (ALLOWED_ATTR.shadowroot || ALLOWED_ATTR.shadowrootmod) {\n /*\n AdoptNode() is not used because internal state is not reset\n (e.g. the past names map of a HTMLFormElement), this is safe\n in theory but we would rather not risk another attack vector.\n The state that is cloned by importNode() is explicitly defined\n by the specs.\n */\n returnNode = importNode.call(originalDocument, returnNode, true);\n }\n\n return returnNode;\n }\n\n let serializedHTML = WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? body.outerHTML : body.innerHTML;\n\n /* Serialize doctype if allowed */\n if (\n WHOLE_DOCUMENT &&\n ALLOWED_TAGS['!doctype'] &&\n body.ownerDocument &&\n body.ownerDocument.doctype &&\n body.ownerDocument.doctype.name &&\n regExpTest(EXPRESSIONS.DOCTYPE_NAME, body.ownerDocument.doctype.name)\n ) {\n serializedHTML =\n '<!DOCTYPE ' + body.ownerDocument.doctype.name + '>\\n' + serializedHTML;\n }\n\n /* Sanitize final string template-safe */\n if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {\n serializedHTML = stringReplace(serializedHTML, MUSTACHE_EXPR, ' ');\n serializedHTML = stringReplace(serializedHTML, ERB_EXPR, ' ');\n serializedHTML = stringReplace(serializedHTML, TMPLIT_EXPR, ' ');\n }\n\n return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE\n ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(serializedHTML)\n : serializedHTML;\n };\n\n /**\n * Public method to set the configuration once\n * setConfig\n *\n * @param {Object} cfg configuration object\n */\n DOMPurify.setConfig = function (cfg) {\n _parseConfig(cfg);\n SET_CONFIG = true;\n };\n\n /**\n * Public method to remove the configuration\n * clearConfig\n *\n */\n DOMPurify.clearConfig = function () {\n CONFIG = null;\n SET_CONFIG = false;\n };\n\n /**\n * Public method to check if an attribute value is valid.\n * Uses last set config, if any. Otherwise, uses config defaults.\n * isValidAttribute\n *\n * @param {string} tag Tag name of containing element.\n * @param {string} attr Attribute name.\n * @param {string} value Attribute value.\n * @return {Boolean} Returns true if `value` is valid. Otherwise, returns false.\n */\n DOMPurify.isValidAttribute = function (tag, attr, value) {\n /* Initialize shared config vars if necessary. */\n if (!CONFIG) {\n _parseConfig({});\n }\n\n const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(tag);\n const lcName = transformCaseFunc(attr);\n return _isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value);\n };\n\n /**\n * AddHook\n * Public method to add DOMPurify hooks\n *\n * @param {String} entryPoint entry point for the hook to add\n * @param {Function} hookFunction function to execute\n */\n DOMPurify.addHook = function (entryPoint, hookFunction) {\n if (typeof hookFunction !== 'function') {\n return;\n }\n\n hooks[entryPoint] = hooks[entryPoint] || [];\n arrayPush(hooks[entryPoint], hookFunction);\n };\n\n /**\n * RemoveHook\n * Public method to remove a DOMPurify hook at a given entryPoint\n * (pops it from the stack of hooks if more are present)\n *\n * @param {String} entryPoint entry point for the hook to remove\n * @return {Function} removed(popped) hook\n */\n DOMPurify.removeHook = function (entryPoint) {\n if (hooks[entryPoint]) {\n return arrayPop(hooks[entryPoint]);\n }\n };\n\n /**\n * RemoveHooks\n * Public method to remove all DOMPurify hooks at a given entryPoint\n *\n * @param {String} entryPoint entry point for the hooks to remove\n */\n DOMPurify.removeHooks = function (entryPoint) {\n if (hooks[entryPoint]) {\n hooks[entryPoint] = [];\n }\n };\n\n /**\n * RemoveAllHooks\n * Public method to remove all DOMPurify hooks\n *\n */\n DOMPurify.removeAllHooks = function () {\n hooks = {};\n };\n\n return DOMPurify;\n}\n\nexport default createDOMPurify();\n"